“[SECRET 1-Mr 0 Mohr 1-Mr. Sullivan 1-Mr. Callahan 1-Mr. Conrad SAC, wFo ((100-18032) (5) 11/22/66 02 Director, FBI (100-357510, 7 (S) 1-Mr. Baker 1-Mr. Allen 092SPYBSN/GCL OFFICE or ME SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE IS -R; CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION JE Declassify$ 219,326 Ci”
“20 Mr. Phillips. For action — not always. Sometimes a 21 cable will come in and there will be more than one copy. 22 And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and 23 then you get the information copy, and so forth. NT 24 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from t”
“tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his? attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if ( there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is docking at”
“any telephone con versation or office conference taking place in those offices. The taping system could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the tele phone in the office or on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the .adjacent office. T”
“embassies overseas 9 and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate /C code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a // senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative 12 part of t”
“communication fellows down in Virginia 4 1 0 F irs t S tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 20 found they could easily monitor long distance telephone 21 conversations from Latin American to Canada, and in some cases 22 to New York, and these frequently ca”
“and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited ”
“that they were successfully transmitted to the recipient. Because processes and resources to perform cleanup activity varies, cables were sometimes held for longer periods but not with the intention of becoming a long-term reference collection. The offices of record for the ”
“■ SECRET/SENSITIVE -9 - 5. On two or. three occasions between 1970 and 19.72 the Washington Field Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a touch-tone” telephone. The request came from foil's and TE*9 loman. Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with 3 andolioand f”
“coaxial cable was unconnected. "2. The second coaxial cable... followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic fl”
“installation of such listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn recalls only three such instances: a. In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to uncover details where an old defector was being forced to make kickb”
“3 g ‘ a” P s 3v'! .*. 07 1./+ 3 u A wwutvs a Ju aes FITo p"! ng 5 tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office- in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing”
“13-00000 > on oseal, 1/0010 i.iw1 Each Eai S tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an ”
“21 3 Mr . Scelo. I think there are about 30‘lines being tapped soi altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mind. Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from OdL both the Soviet and the Cuban? Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects. SHCWET sA *3”
“4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency .to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved- in any way with actual installation of . equipment in Identity 61 From”
“9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was ”
“13 IiP Langelle handled C/A communications in Moscow. The C/A used State Department channels of communication code could ofbutone-pad encrypti so thatbythmeans codengmessages message was secret until it was e forwarded Decodi ng. to C/A Headquarters for 11112581 Or- Ca”
“responsible DES/TOS agent. It is Agent TITISLER‘s plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set”
“13-00000 AOavGet,” • ASSRUD AGS A*000” Classification: ilkns 8 096 NCng W& ] a le (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -56- TH It should be noted, though, that an examination of VB-/ATh, the project files shows that Amer”
“to return all equipment previously loaned- to it by the CIA,and most was returned. Appar ently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other police departments as well). Montgomery County Police Department In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some tr”
“SECRET- - 1 - Liaison - 1 - Mullins -_COPIES nd , DATE.0J-7V.BY * Cac FOR REVIEW - AA5/CR DELIVERY 64-211-210 830 ;e HSCA RE it (SEE BUS. L o :4-28. BY LIAISON 0 CLASSI SU% SLD made CA MAR MAGRJECTION TO Q& $6 DECLA -ON: 25X_ CL ■ V AND/OR, / 4 (JFK) S-ORMATION,, 0 ”
“iUr SEGKEI 30 11 <1 kind of document. 2 Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would this document go today? 3! Mr. Tovar. You mean from the State Department? 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which 5 is indicating that an American citizen is giving information, 6 intel”
“months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls. ’ • .Z. 9 1: Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.. ce NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify p”
“Headquarters 31 (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Explora tory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot . . , . . 34 NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 244'”
“MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy in 1971 and 1972 a 1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of this Agencylin April-May 1971. This operation, which used Agency equipment and ”
“ellite Em- possible cou Tin Cuban O Kerage an and shitening dio telephone taps on these Embassies so bassies in anticipation of possible disconnected all of the u that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five”
“ATTACHMENT • FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and”
“• TO 91wihima 1-25 1 I Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. A best guess would be helpful. 2 Mr. Shaw. I would guess three or four lines. The primary 3 interest was in the Soviets. You had far more converage. .4 That is a guess. S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. 2002% (202) 554”
“rye 0 SSCI Box 288, Folder 9 TOP SECRET (XGDS) 2 288-9 ! Record Number 157-10011-10078 MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN THE TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN February 17, 1975 Background of Mr. Osborn See the written statement submitted to the Commission by Mr. Osborn”
“I SEGKET 1-30 i : reference purposes, we simply use those numbers for a witness 2 when we are going through this pile of materials. 3 Now I would like you to take a look at CIA No. 197, the 4; second paragraph. (Pause) (2 0 2 ) 5 5 1 -2 3 4 5 Mr. Shaw. Okay. 6 7 ”
“dish” GA AXAi” ABtitS” Gout GBEawe” % Classification:. (This form is to be used for material, extracted from CIA—controlled d ocuments.) - 19 3 and 8; HMMA-21845, 7/30/€3, paras. 3 and 8; Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4. 255/ B. Tar”
“R. Fox Company, ternauonal intelligence divi- Enclosed i, a catalog einein. -ei-inein. The The colonel said that colonel said he often that he quoted as often quoted as a wiretap ex- a wiretap n could recall how he had learned, pert. sion said that he received the was pu”
“ence was made in this cable to the receipt of a similar anonymous telephone call en 15 October 1962. 3. Upon receipt of thia cable from Navy CIA took the following action. a. Gabled to Canberra acking full details of the telaphone convarsation of 23 November and the call made ca ”
“-27- Oh, you mean what the agents brought in? FS: What the two agents brought in. ML: Yes. FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's... ML: Cameras. FS: They brought cameras... ML: Mm- hmm. FS: which were installed. ML: Yeah. FS: What else did”
“-27- Oh, you mean what the agents brought in? FS: What the two agents brought in. ML: Yes.• FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general’s... ML: . Cameras. FS: They brought cameras... ML.: Mm-hmm. FS: which were installed. ML: Yeah. FS: .What else”
“TAPE 2 111 A 0 4o . . CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING T) T( 59 h :0 OF ROD CHINA - 1960 A/ A mt Pesid/ew In February, 1960,^ Trrervec-werngmmenratout. for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by ESSSTTMDIMMMERB, a top”
“SECRET EYES CHLY B, During the period from 1968 to 1973, several 'items of positive audio equipment consisting pri- V .marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone ■ dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax-County,—Virginia, Police Dep”
“told him I had no idea upon the occurrence of certain. dCen 10 K Cat CASSsaSX.nacson Eatea stufr." They had Stee the context in which it was i conditions relating 10 light in equipment ‘: : phone that could be triggered untien- and hat. I had not tensity.” ‘ I P - * *. by rem”
“telephone:/the formal telephone company traffic apparently 21 without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to 22 microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone 23 A calls. 24 Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the 25 penetration of emba”
“liShnvindt” Aids’ ■Jagger Alls8” ShithEP” StaNE” Ratines” doran * Classification: 1 17 03 CED isGL 9IL (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -56- It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows tha”
“13-00000 FINAL Report OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD :: Record reviewed unilaterally by CIA. in 1992. Same record after Review Board action io 1995. USA Iwwwv.9 REPUXUEOSIU CA USE BNEW CIA RELEASE I SUNJECT: Tele in « line the fits € cable stout SC JCr: “cle ”
“that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the Agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building.* The “This was not the only time that the CIA blew major “uses over- 795 seas. During the mid-1960s, the Ag”
“7 Classification: BE 0 6E. (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) - 15 - the technician turned the liaison responsibilities over to a case officer.17/ He could not remember with certainty the identity of that case officer, but ”
“the establishment at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intelligence network. Also under investi gation during this period at New York City was an IIS attempt to 6 penetrate United Nations and official Arab establishments by the use of live so”
“14-00000 % -1 pin only fa 7^^ Eiso 8.1 31 December 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II / and MOCKINGBIRD 1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Dir”
“dhW SAES” Chew’ AS lew NrilE” SR 1 Classification: 1100 75 9E*05l E (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -57- 2 there has not been any change in the lines covered since September.206/ A review of the transcripts produced by ”
“sin AlS * Classification: ETAP N PHIL-- inn TO0ln (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) - 71 - in a chronological file, 29/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/ (g) Form”
“-29- hours. Well, it didn't happen. I suspected that it, would take longer than that; I don't know how you intrude on a 990 T.V. stations 0,8 A: broadcasting and get the people in the 0 immediately to their T,V, sets country to go A. d« . and watch a program. • I call”
“14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL 15-45-31 DAL-108-72 Director, Domestic Contact Service 1 May 1972 ATIN .: usS (Watts) : Er cat, Dallas ricia oertes 'tep Interest th zlnctronle Surveillance Syeren A-154531 1. A year or so ago, while in Miami, I forwarded some interested and sen”
“thistoequip-ia being ofgiven any-turbance explosive. exntsse modaeElectronics packed sassination techniques by a pri-j'discourage him,' Mr. Weickerment was demonstrated to Louliiitciarette hack whenthe - vate . PinE manufacturer of wiretap said. in this office about and b”