“— TELEGRAM NrORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM 162 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which i”
“13-00000 0 TOP SECRET DINAR OTHER CUBAN REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION - cont’d Carlos Lechuga, Cuban UN ambassador, issued a statement early on 23 November stating: "Despite the antagonisms exist ing between the Government of the United States and the Cuban Revolution”
“bearded prime minister — who L ca / pui and understands English well — turn- jot DIDN’T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard d around flamboyantly and; raising his % of the assassination threat but gave vague rea vat called to me in a friendly way: Lz1 sons for not reporting it ”
“even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for ("What’s that? An attempted assassination?") He then example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all down in Dallas. ”
“He said,"we always cease our belligerency at death; we always bow with respect at death, even if it has to do with an enemy." ■ Castro declared that the assassination can only benefit "those ultrarightist and ultrareactionary sectors, among which President Kennedy could not ”
“1 4-00000 coper - E. IN 10G15 MAGIS AVGI HAS CRITICIZED "IMPER IAL ISTS. PLANS AGAINST CUBA" SINCE BEGINNING CASTRO REGIME, ESPECIALLY DURW6 Hie PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S TENURE IN OFFICE. YET, ON 21 NOV 65 AVGI PRAISED KENNEDY, STATED WARREN COMMISSION REPORT UNTRUE USING ”
“disagreed with his international policy.” "What is behind all this? What sinister maneuver are they hatching behind all this? Who can be re sponsible for the assassination of President Kennedy? And who benefits from the assassination., except the worst reaction aries?" Cas”
“. FYI: Presume Hqs is aware of AP story dateli ned Hava Sep t 63. At reception at B razilian Emb Fid el CASTRO is Quoted: We ar e prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U nited States leaders s hould think ( reflect?) tha t if they are aid ing ter rorist plans to eliminate th”
“3/0/CUD/T1382-63 and -T1381-63, 23 November, TOP SECRET DINAR) °A il 29 24 \ The Cuban (Foreign Ministry/dispatched a circular) message late on 22 November to a number of Cuban diplomatic missions? abroad stating only "do not make any statements." This was probably an atte”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR FIDEL CASTRO’S SPEECH: Fidel Castro's two-hour speech on 23 November was what he termed an "objective analysis" of the implications of President Kennedy's assassination. The — speech - reflected - an apprehension that US policy toward him may n”
“13-0,0000 TOP SECRET DINAR DAILY SUMMARY 25 November 1963 This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the com”
“killed he would have been replaced by some military announced over the radio that it was now known that : figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." ne commen- pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also tator follow”
“"Everything is changed. Everything is going to the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted change. The United States occupies such a position in to him of an interview which President Kennedy world affairs that the death of a President of that granted me this last ctob”
“all: "What authority does he exercise Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes de saw that it would be half an hour before we reached cency, dignity, respect. ”
“ernación as source. FYI: Presume Hqs is aware of AP story datelined Hava Sept 63. At reception at Br az il ia n Emb Fidel CASTRO is Quot ed: We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders should think (reflect?) that if they are aiding terrorist plans to ”
“-6 • como las que inicialmente sefalo, a fin de provocar una reaecion energica desde @1 punto de vista politico de parte de los Esta- 1 dos Unidos de Norteamerica, en contra del Gobierno de FIDEL CAS- had 0 TRO RUZ, y que no tuvo otro motivo mas que el profundo odio cue- ”
“are of AP story datelined H ava Sept 63. At reception at Bra zilian Emb Fidel CASTRO is Q uoted: W e are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders should think (reflect?) that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate the Cuban leaders, they themselve”
“from Cuba. Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance meeting the Prime Minister. You were very ■ fortunate." 3of American President Kennedy. I agreed and asked when my longer interview Could you tell me if there is any truth at all “I thought the’ visits might be something”
“upon his re- Might not some overzealous security of- ed to assure the continued development turn, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he ficials have taken this for tacit authority of his revolution. In practical terms, this found a remarkably receptive Fidel Cas- to set up a “progr”
“declare Goldwater D’ he work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!" Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The This conversation was held on November 19. econd call came through: it was hoped they would be Now it”
“Mr. Kennedy what could be expected one of the most, if not the most, important problems in from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United American foreign OT policy. / I can assure you that I have States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." understood the ”
“advised that reaction among the Cuban exiles is "very bad against the United States". He explained that the Cuban exiles allege that President KENNEDY has made promises to help them in their fight against CASTRO but is now opposing them and consequently they feel that the U. ”
“datelined Hava Sept 63. At reception at Brazilian Emb Fidel CASTRO is Quoted: We are prepared to fi ght them and answer in kind. United States leaders should think (reflect?) that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate the Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.”
“sfirmeren los vaci- lanteo que, legicamente, quieren lo n eguro. Solo a las Embajadas acredi tadas en La Habaca se permitira importer lo que necesitar para 82 subsistorcia, previo registro er 10g E. U., y gecer a eus connacionales por la misma via, para registrarles minucio-”
“in Latin America: as it He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechan- has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we ■ ical gesture which had. become famous: - alone have this power — on the essential condition that ■ ' "I tell you this: we know perfectly what hap”
“had enough of their Cuban involve thing, and we are still alive and getting better day by ment. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speak-' . day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to cele ing from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force brate with gr”
“Nations, told his superiors he had that normal relations could be restored proved guilty. It is hoped that tlie inves- word that Castro wanted an accommoda- “on the basis of mutual respect for sover- tigations to come will proceed on the tion. John Kennedy got the message and e”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR CASTRO’S SPEECH; Fidel's 27 November speech to the students at Havana University evidently had been scheduled some weeks ago, be fore the assassination of President Kennedy, and was in tended as a fairly sweeping review of the country's economi”
“Gaullists surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But were not the only ones in France who deplored certain . it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time Cuban one, and has become international - that ”
“think we are romantics, don't you? you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are - not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplace - has supported the Latin A”
“TAG 3 An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press' Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15 (AP) Nov. 18 The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association: * * * "The genuine Cuban revolution — because it ”
“-he Tne New Republic invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organiza’in upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his state of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above ev'ty- ment by pronouncing each sylimble separately] Ken tKing, all the retaliatory measures wh”
“views on the slaying of the.| i U.S. President.I Mt exactly how it was reported to me — = E bu ‘Maybe I’ll try to do it.’ thr g To shed more light on the most | “This was less than 2 months before the I dramatic event of , the 20th | thi U.S. President was assassinated. | ”
“disappeared. Continuing on to Caimanera, the bus stopped in the town square with the same woman sitting on one of the seats inside the vehicle. The militia again was summoned and again the woman was nowhere to be seen. On 26 November the same woman allegedly appeared outside ”
“roughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this - event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in th”
“something else, specifi- ■ ’"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to cally apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev the new situation in Cuba was intoler”
“DECtr BER 7, 1963 once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emo intellectual qualities of the assassinated President,1 tion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of re- - awakened the keenest interest in him. sentment”
“When Lastro Heard the News TA71 An 1 HIavans ' It was around 184 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We « TAB N both the American continents -achieve this goat, a were having lunch in the living room of the modest leader would have to arise in the United States capable summer r”
“1IH.: : JBCIC otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they wis he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In try to put the blame on us for this thing but tell in saying simply that he is an admisse, this is just to trv how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four”
“all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: interview With the President. We went up to my "The continuation of the blockade depends on the con room at to in the evening and did not leave until 4 in tinuation of su”
“Washington has yet to come coups called to his office, the repre- : ‘policy policy toward Cuba wa was pro ated up with a viable policy toward Fidel ntative stressed that "the spirit as s and signed by President Kenne and signed " v on Cet. I Castro to put a stop to his subverti”
“SSING INTEL DEBRIEFING. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32373793 Page 4 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7. IN 30453 PAGE 24 SECRET 5. INTEL DEBRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS FOLL: A CASTRO TRIP MOSCOW: TRIP MADE PRIMARILY TO GAIN USSR ECONOMIC AID, SECONDARILY TO SHOW PSP "OLD GUARD" THEY NO LONGER NECESSARY IN CA”
“y David W. Belin to Mr. E. Henry Knoche , 1 5 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, etc.), attached BACKGROUND PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY 1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Ha”
“LArc NET., 'iru15 L Dc : educate our young companeros. This doesn’t mean we which diplomatic relations with the United States do not feel solidarity toward nations that arc struggling would pose! The Swiss Ambassador representing the' and suffering, like the Venezuelan people”
“Knoche, 15 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, etc.), attached BACKGROUND 1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal interview by the Ass”
“world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be .was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to _my turn next." Butist y<k. The next word was: the ■ envisage relations between Cuba and the United States assassin is a”
“14-00000 ALJUN.--- 0*1 •• OUTGOING MESSAGE ae• • 3._ * SIGNAL crotsiusE ONLY• sod Cra ACP 100 page or Pacts rpe Gne OMF 0 0 0 0 00 3 CLlsericaton SE CRE T 08 seAGtwewotro mowA900 oare-nudjanoum. cnis message nerenanca numore • 9 0 w** DISSEM By. CONF: INFO: FIL”
“against the dissemination ■ of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the .security of other countries, if only because he lacks the •. necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador -to”
“his agreement to the interview, that this - event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States. : NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 2 SECRET 0002665 61 PAGE COPY NO. 186 of جمرة f SECRET ! 3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range”
“14-00000 S_CAal RY2AT TELEPOUCH- IHIEN06 WOULD LIKE 1) SEE SIN ACO-THEY WOULD WELCORE HI, THAT HE HAD LEFT CUBA TOO SOON are THAT HE WOULD 55 rg OF HIS COUNTRYMEN IF ME WoUL: RETURN AN D HE PROCESS MADE. A-5 THEN SAID THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAICAOLE To HIM THE ECO”