“debriefing. CONTINUED ox REVERSE RECEPTIVITY TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. LIST any INFLUENCING FACTORS (Rootrictione, Policies, »eJ Sternberg is likely to be receptive to operational requirements, but may not have the authority to commit the organization. 1FIELO orrict ”
“)4-00000 % NCTTT MAPGENE scAr ACT DAWEE iDIN. TEDCATY 1 & EMLSFERUIG VAXM\NO. • "RASA” ! Jon SPTGLA: OPERATIONS mods ftoil LIAISON AS Rip WITH: PLANNING GROUP RT ARMY SIONICS SCAF - MliTui" ~OTHERS RT AIR FORCE fir. :1. Werbell (To be 1 (Th be As Req:! st RT ”
“go TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING # Gen. Harris; Economic (limited deception). Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Mr. Wilson; Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions f”
“OF THE STATION AND BASES. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN AUSTRALIA, THE OVERACC MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HQS IN MANAGE MENT OF STAT ION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIA ISON, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION O”
“However, to get to latter . it must be done logically. .2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose—collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay %ground work for future development”
“ISHMENT OF -INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C0/0 SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID • 0 WE ENSURE THAT C/0S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WIT”
“leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, .etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information .here to work with,, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Al”
“OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C0/0 SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN Contacting AN AGENT, HOW DID' WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL ACONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH”
“:/ titl ctors "Age >11 971min.. e-t*u! counter-insurgency 1 1.. L 1 in C: : Called A, weather. tert 11:1. v.Llo +1-2 arsa: ilities. nd intimate 6t it iel V in tne or-erational area. Addi- C100N0 the critical factors’ in counter-insurgency Obe r• •L%on5 til.: S/C operations”
“OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP Potential. 9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET* HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER SECRET”
“operations, support operationsiei V c -w tg e n e * --- 10. rokiniGalotsintor ‘ 1 indicanoat TRAIninovou O0L irve YOU SwoULD wavs 0u#:u6 Tut etay SEVEaL YEARS 3 the Clandestine services review, Mid-career, short reports writing Its I ■ courses • $0 9 0-22 202 233812”
“14-000'00 Ahuost mppanin h-tr grindlee BMWW)!^*./‘ SLUNHF PAGE TWO 1300-1500 PM Techniques, Reconnaissance, Raid PIRNACK DECOKRABD and Ambush 1700-2200 Introduction to Clandestine Maritime FAITELSON PACHANKIS Operations 11 January 1000-1500 Maritime Operational Plannin”
“933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, •5 FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED To MEET SECRET at”
“SECRET PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE. 1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment , Questionnaire' (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires - for”
“a thorough assessment of this asset‘s capability and subsequently trained, motivated, and handled him effectively before turning - SECRET”
“security reviews of operational activities. g. Coordinate double agent operations. : E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055431 ’J cpordt wi. ..l”
“eng Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested. 5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make man”
“choser tart Hal :or red ian! tt in 4 t. ■.• thflan : 1. vit : giz from wake 105 to 2o,cholojical eration 6 C-N41 funter/Filler operations in conjunction with xh znd bl’p units, or with MrG Mobile Training Units must include Provision for comprehensive psychological o”
“CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre senting COS/Army. 68/ - 90 — TOP SECRET”
“neighborhood three hundredpeople, f Te ■ and that 21 21 was those people who would be involved in the management 22 effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover 23 procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing 24 out from that were people w”
“1 340 / ,19 1 $ /1.0 fr*. SSNJer. 3. G 5. dectivel 6. I re rap Title 6 C. Suowe 6 6 tation and Manager ent 10 12 tent ■a 12 Nt 10-2 ‘ising" 9 *, ’_ nations 13 * :: linning, C’roniration --aflne%w*tnarsRutols in : tallation of Training Cer ,■.'r”
“interest of collecting .. marginal intelligence. -Must -be prepared- to sacfrice - diversionary - tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective.. If tangential . things are Tolled up we then have a different op, and a new op . line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves a”
“specialized personnel, the GAUAS would go and locate the 21 personnel, talk to them, spot them, get their personal history 22 from them, send it in, and the: people would be traced out and 23 checked and cleared and eventually introduced to the station 24 case officer who”
“a"leader"i (Lieutenant) and an"assistant leadori (Sergeant). These men shall be given special training by the Secret Army Organization at "leadership seminars". h. Team "marshialliug points" should be selected in advance and be well defined. Practice"alerts" will determine t”
“V. ‘CONCEPT OF Ori.RATIONS A. General Concept The purpose of this program will be to strike 8 the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Co”
“CEOD [T •.... i./ ili. ! 0002455 I General A. duties B. Typical II People II day - list III the survellance ops. - I1”
“14-00000 9, • SECRET PAGE, THREE 16 January 1000-1200 Mission Briefings - A Management Control REUTEMAN DECONBAIDD 7400-1800 Commando Raids 1900-2300 Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation ZAMKA, None-ni. Case History) 17 January ,1000-1200 Management of Maritime Ass”
“Legal, ettica(>morale, operational problems; political: non-attribute- 1belite 4 a) Our onn experience (Bangkok) (+eflect on DDP) and experience W/KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khohhloo) -> profesuinial, proven operationally competent, ruttilere, stable require most CE-exenie”
“Orientation, Introduction to Intelligence Techniques and the Operational Fumi liarization Course. If the CT has served in an attached capacity with one of the Staffs or Divisions .upon completion of the OFC, the assessment of that Staff or Division on the CT’s performance an”
“agent’s sensitivity of the opt ration should be indicated—e.g., observation, special suitability to the cover suggested and, or the special ad spotting and reporting only; case officer for established agents; vantages of the cover vis-a-vis the target. SECRET SECRET”
“political left and terrorist movement, and handling the Principal agent (LOC) presently employed at the Station. 4. TRAINING or siato INDICATE HA T TRAINING vou ofulEve vou SN00L0 •' nminc TMf Welt stvteal vears raining should be keyed to provide an even broador base for th”
“targets of opportunity. f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation. OCADET /1A00 I te onor a ««• •”
“NECESSITY MILITARY DISCIPLINE OPS MATTERS, Ph AMYUM LEADERSHIP, WHICH MORE CONCERNED FURTHERING IDEALS THAN G-6,AC HE TETUTE ONE FenChan G85 PAIR A/1, n EFFORT CAPTURE CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION For SELF 4.’% . 1.. • eerestr, .4 %.. I *l bote CHUPT" fedtdweesu-ereris SECRET *”
“opportunity. Case Officer - Natthew S. DHOLEY a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LICCL phase of the LIFfAT Project. b Conduct the training of all personnel aseipned to the LICOOL phase. C. Maintain LICOL capabilities for mounting operations against targe”
“2 preparation for adranceddraining in these three importanioastivities which will be dealt with in greater detan further on in the training program. INTI!I.UGHNCE Underground warfare, as we customarily think of it, cannot succeed unless it is supported by a well developed ”
“I cfciL of 1.11 inter/killerd : 0.11 - iff ive and vift teai r-ion and with- % *....... t. 3. ceil rerations: ter/diller T’cams will operate .in tive order areas and villaer complexes in order to operate directly nitlin the population against and within ■ which _ .anist”
“the out standingly successful U. S, 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of he Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla o”
“14-00000 Afr.NDla1 PROJECT LIPSTICK SCHESULE OF ISPR CTION 10 June Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology. 11-21 June Tradecraft (1) Nature ane Characteristics of Clandestine Activity Clandestine Activity of the Individual and”
“either in operation or planned for the near future. 4. The actual identity of enemy agents, fellow travelers and sympathi zers along with details regarding their work, place of residence, cover opera tion, means of transportation, travel pattern, personal appearance, menta”
“each of you for the Tuesday meeting: Mr. Harvey: Intelli V’olitical (splitting the regime, , I honomic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilita Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the Mr. Hurwitch: Steterd Objectives, Political, and Economic. Als”
“and by nature ho seems to instinctively conduct his clandestine operations in a secure manner. Andrew S. Parsers OTR Training Officer SECRET Fichtet 0:37 tn: 13!”
“been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly we11 placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number" of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, ”
“Special Operational Team and the three lunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG. -18- Pt-a--S9ernkilafnrseanwateere9:42i1tiverlirs 2.12”
“-6- d. Surveillances: 9- Agent Acquisition 1. Spotting 3. Aspeasmout 3. Recruitcout 4. Training 5. Manacerent 6. Terminations f . Clandestine Communications G. Counter Intelligence b. Interrogation 1. Reporting J. Intel ligence Research and Analysis 06 8. It is re”
“C. Provide advice and support for Station's CP penetration program.I % 46. TraihinG osincO, AT MAST TRAINING »M otievt You ^O „,( GW,„The near Stytnadveang None 05 202 :2791433 SECRET”
“four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number' of these contacts for periods ranging up to t”
“Operating () Propaganda Off,Media ( )L f de c. Support ( ) Security Officer (2 d. Training Communications officer ( )F - 6.4 Sabotage Officer (1) [Logistics Officer ( ) P- a. Plon.,Target.,Train()) Medical Officer ( ;00 b. Expiosiveespecial D Vicen Other ( 1° % PA "12 c.U”
“limitations of the role a can and sh this selow base of s’ ecses DoD, and materielt emotional of CIA’s spparons ---------- with some inborn jingoism). setstes *X6”
“S 30 December 1970). -- - 2e*s*Cour--"6- Spot, develop, assess, and recruit agents to obtain i watiN LETTER .intelligence from the decision-making level of the communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and thoir main front organizations. P seddine Darrjea, •. . • ! Lery”
“the Special operations and ounter, idler Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their asic roles that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy -23- 2.12 s”