“c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 3 CLASSIFtU TOP SECRET SPCNL-IANDHNG- NOEARN”
“or whether the internal security forces* itch are *.1 very fragmented among the mi 1 it ry and the states and what have you p. whether these interna 1 socuri by forces all re lice are just on tlic Ur nvvn life may ve . /y:;1 1 iL t’i ?H t -I? TOP SECRET v. trt: " P 1/”
“A-1 AS THEY HAVE IN PAST. -LNAGON COMMENTED IT WAS THEIR UNDER STANDING THAT WHEN TWO : C MORE U.S. COVERNMENT ACENCIES.HAVE AN INTEREST IN THEY - SAME IND IV IDUAL THAT FRROWNS RULE IN THE MAR COTICS SOURCE RECISTSY WAS MERELY TO ADVISE THE INTERESTED PARTIE S CF THE - C5”
“that he thought the jurisdictional issue should be "soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that - 99 - TOP SECRET”
“/ PAGE TWO « SE 100-NEW DRAWAL OF ALL U. S. MILITARY FORCES FROM INDO CHINA. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE SPONSORING ■ COMMITTEE OTHER THAN TO STATE THAT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE A GROUP OF WOMEN ORIENTED TOWARD ANARCHISTIC BELIEFS WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC AFFILIA”
“z------ --------- ------- .3- PAGES ONE AND TWO OF YOUR BRIEFING PAPER ARE RIGHT ON THE S MARK. PAGE THREE HOWEVER CONTAINS SOME—ISSUES THAT WE REQUEST YOU DELETE AND/OR SOFTEN. A. /FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. DO NOT DISCUSS ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONS WITH THE SENATOR. WE”
“susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures. (Page 163, lines 11-14.) Jon H K1 we nonnotive Arbatitite independent. alive CONFIDENTIAL @/mc) C/3”
“er, since we feel that it must judge the matter in terms of its own policies and national interests. NW 65987 Docld:32413161 Page 1 1 104-10180-10095 2”
“-99- as brakes are concerned, they've had them from the beginning. However, the objectives and 05ai»/ the intent are approved, and not the means of doing it-the nuts and bolts—which are supposedly overseen by an ambassador. And when we get down to the level of a country •”
““SERIOUS", IMPLYING SOMETHING "OFFICIAL" (SHE MEAT IONED SHE DIS-So S APPOINTED GERENDE NOT L#ERGO MEMBER). GERENDE ASSE SMENT IS SHE MIGHT BE WILLING COOPERATE IF HE CAB REVEAL L HARP BROKING. IF APPROVAL GIVEN BY HD @S PIN ISSUE GEBENDE FALSE "DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COU”
“mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring unilateral operations in France (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging, blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.) „0 CONFIDENTIAL CIl (5/mc)”
“no chance for success of en 5 4 armed movement. “It was agreed that even though the Committee 4 3. 3 2 2 1 1 Lrnge 1 triveis s.e wi-sot. teonvelns ord SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - tele-t-ci-at STATE -QtA JAAMY NAVY INA AID OCA FBI #3 CINCSO #- USIA I*We (Niote. Fold du”
“either side, without authorization from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY”
“receptivity of CON (GOB) to an CAS resolution authorizing use force. Ambassador should proceed on assumption report CAS investigation committee strongly aTole-” winovtermoot”
“1 NY 185-229 / There follows the results of the interviews conducted with the UN Security Force: % / I” « a / # -12- io. NW 88296 Docld:32989574 Page 77. ! • 1”
“13-00000 CONCLUSION Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U. S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change th”
“composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally. JOHN H. RICHA RUSOM Chief, SE ce: C/PP C/IO/PP IO/PP (Mr. Durkee) General Counsel”
“key country there must be a central op- erational capacity and thority e’ith direct lines to the levels of action in Washington. --------- —eyt 0-46A4%* NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 15”
“subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Oirtain emigration to take the line of early rope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed for”
“been sent <.. to all USIB- Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House. “er= ws" 2 _AMFIDEM TIAL”
“resoonsibiliti 21. . 28 which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented Part of our problem with this decision is, as hn: been 13 I stated and noted non ryf !•)■-» rrntimgt: of former lTr ie against the background of tiro pre: ent situation. ‘le rest of”
“military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques tions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge untrgentirna. 3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET”
“of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FY NW 50955—Dacld:32423505 Page-95 TOP SECRET 235 T”
“shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that 25 June -proposed latest version, chargesincorporating by DoD.”
“with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions 6/25/75”
“status, but this reads a little bit as though it woro putting on the trappings of national sovereignty. THOM: • W. ERADFN Chief International Organisations Division Attachments ‘s stated. CIO:TWB/mf Distribution: Dux Orig - Addressee (CPP) 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI 1 cc ”
“rage of a diplomatic establishmen t. NW 65994 Docld:32989561 Page 6 CO.TEGIAL Ty : ( CONFIDENTIAL Th e Attorney General 1 1.”
“ND WILLPUlLy FALSIFYING OH CONCHALNO A MATERIAL FACT. CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DEC ASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT”
“that way in all areas or not, but if they do then.It seems to me it would raise a very serious question as to whether or not the H troops are getting the right orders. "Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that some 50 "Mr. Gilpatric....I thought there ”
“THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY, BECAUSE OF THE Origin AND NATURE OF THE RElATIoN- - SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT. SECRET”
“the western GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED: sponsors of the provision claim with Bonn Chancellor Konrad i +46 sraboard. Extending along the Never a clear point, this vaguely that "other purposes" provides an Aderaner in Paris. They approved| length of the twisting line is a worded item ”
“13-00000 hexineoilombiaidbroibneem 4 -3- 98 that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commit- ments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan. It was agreed that State and Defense should draft ”
“their decisions will never be revealed. Whatever can be said in defense of the original pur pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 557”
“but, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve; C. should be kept in mind as examples of other charges which may be bandied about and reported by the AMLASH group to other governmental agencies or to other governments or to new”
“DIRECTED AND, IN ! HIS ESTIMATION, HAS A GCOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. SOURCE SAID WERBELL EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REVEAL ADDITIONAL 5 INFORMATION TO INTERESTED U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNING rim 4 a PLANS AND TIE ORGANIZATION BEHIND KE CLANDESTINE OPERATION 2 1 COORDINAT”
“Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rat”
“the exchange of resources of both countries? To Jan Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite correct. Everything except their own people. It was givi TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docld:32423393 Page 15”
“as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations. -6 - NW88296.Docld:32989628 Page 1803 "-”
“14-00000 SECRET -2- i 1 SECURITY INFORMATION of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.H. but the timing and use of t”
“inevitably bring about a confronta- \ tion with the US. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 69”
“ntact Report. C/ял and I felt that we did not have as yot sufficient data to make any commitmentes C instructed me to advise Ray thats (a) Either the KRF should submit a detailed plan which we would consider and on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistan”
“-99- as brakes are concerned, they've had them from the beginning. However, the objectives and ■ 05aiv/ the intent are approved, and not the means of - doing it—the nuts and bolts—which are supposedly overseen by an ambassador. And when we get down to the level of a count”
“instance, cited to support an argu- ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val idity of standing estimates. -16- %/p from 0 JR Fon”
“NCNE, with every his opinion -heard- and his influence felt. opportunity to have in But after a decision has been wide, in good faith and after long consideration, to moloy a ran because of his competence to do a job, it is rr. ifeiffer’s responsibility 68 associate of the ”
“passed (ostensibly f roa Usadquartera), the Ita lian sees no problem arising from the present arrangement. TORCET”
“being answered, NCFZ erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time. 1 ”
“should not reach any agreement in regards to the exchange with the Diplomats. i-memenr--- :...... * ----- - .............. ...”
“with the delegation. --..***. TOP SECRET”
“reverent. It ic re lieved that there C. vers : .tal ..o setc: ts tal co.clme % at the US favored expanding SCIE in France at the L unse or to newly formed Pronch C:. ittre for Free Jure w..ich sa the general no roval c? t.a. present Fresea tev ru cit. ‘ is :1 N’t have an aa”
“which was a major political factor within tha Conun then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that. *111. I think it is that this would be a byproduct of this, that we would get more good reporting on the subject. TOP SECRET 2 0”