“observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. 4 The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be 6001237 examined and can be cited as follows. G5ol? 1 Excludes t szimmatic ”
“given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts 19 0001097 SECRET y .r.. :59 % •/** ISA”
“ime is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation. TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 1 : : i i ! NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 3 104-10210-10015 TOP C EYCO CO 2. 4 Highlights to Date 5. 03 WALD Case: The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoiake”
“13-00000 O ranchay Re: NOSENKO Having Reniewell Buy 451 note several. Reports, identified as E author not compl e tel y - We D Conclusions & Comments in ite Case of is in Box 45,(ile JuninI.(ThisNosenho"(as) Sal8ic JReport) -264 pgs. Foiser (Il Lasheen released in V”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“14-00000 SECRET / II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CAS^ SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 - 6300P 1 Excluded from automatic C001010 SECRET downgrading and declassification”
“14-00000 • v. annex A - Statements o: Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 2 - Sun. ■ e O. Cases No: Examined in Text Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers % 3 G0010C5 ( FORET 1 oLuRI-1 \ .J”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“The : matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first,be made on the respon- cu sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. 0001166 :6 SECRE % 9aa”
“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“1 4-00000 SECRET IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO * -eo*p: 0. 0001112 -SECRET :Exctacez r. art:motte - Conopraling and o rowsenu y. 4 *2 1 , - )■ ilixo U b ill gin W 26 26 a t”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“the material was actually missing. “The letter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963. 00011C9 --- 3 SECRET chia .R 1”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.) 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy”
“great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001012 F TEL”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character- ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO 0001207 47”
“Army, Naval, and Air attaches.* Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service Wuewiie attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally. responsible for (as contrasted to supervising”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“1 4-00000 (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Ch of which he reviewed and that he kept one. regmatt- Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the”
“14-00000 5 00 . ■ th it SECRET II. SUMMARY OF DEVEIOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1.957 . * * * * * * * W W HC92Do/3," • , SOUP 1 Encindes from automatic 0001010 SECRET I downgrading ui declassification Can asclisioie”
“1 4-00000 wide SECRET .. V • ecrurdl: E. CAN THE INFORMATION FCI SHED BY NCSENKO BE CONSIDERED :N TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR,HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 3 q J 3 ”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character ized in the previous summary as singular apd it was stated that NOSENKO 0001207 47 QFPDFT OLUILE mar”
“14-00000 LAGS (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usu”
“KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. • !I1 : 6001079 4 SECRET OLUALT 4”
“or obtained Source #1 through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #2 and 5898710989--47693007, have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has CAP --URCT : cladan Lui : (-4r2iag id A”
“Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. - 2 0001012 S”
“Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart- —— ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explan”
“14-00000 vLURLE ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, " Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations.*t*om.,9o" a. Information from NOSENKO In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist IR Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, 5 . which had theretofore concerned itself with”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“14-00000 we SECRET A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL, TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 620:2 1 . Excluded frem aslomatic 0001025 SECRE declassification downgrading and!”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would . have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but 14. G001174 V eM am DemPDFT ‘ 1 :L 1 ‘ *ie A 3”
“13-00000 Source 111 Source 112 said, but under the given circums tances of how 700-9/8080/998408 and acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted Source 112, Source #3 and Source 11”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”