“LATIN AMERICA OVER SOVIET INTENT IONS IN CUBA, IT STRESSED DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING FURNISHED 4 CUBANS IN AND IMPLICITLY DENIED ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO ESTABLISH LN MILITARY RISKS BASES IN CUBA. STATEMENT, MOREOVER, CONVEYED INDIRECT ASSURANCE THA”
“the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently . sophisticated equipment, although in small ”
“- 34 e had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in”
“already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not”
“SECRET 2. The Department of Defense: A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to t”
“Santiago provided information on Cuban armymmnne laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as. on Soviet troops and materiel movements. 6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet-. occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in - the Havan”
“SECRET D INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAR MILITARY BUILDUP I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT The dramatic events which, occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introd”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST E. Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase) 18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping • information, communications intelligence, and agent and refugee source”
“had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intell”
“SECRET - 19 - Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month betwe”
“pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re mains a matter for speculation. The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continu”
“ing on the recommendation in the paper on "Th e Movem ent of Subversives and Subversive Trai nees" a nd other sources, instructed the non-isthmian posts to encourage host governments to take additional counter-subversion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local situation”
“3. USSR-Cuba a. In the past week we inter- cepted Cuban military messages which show that Cuban interpreters are now posted at several surface-to-air mis sile (SAM) sites on the island. b. We think this means that on-site training of Cubans has begun on schedule. Field tr”
“SECRET troths-l-mb---ar-eenicte -7- * 2. Control of Kovo^nt of Cdjtin Propaganda Central Intelligence Agency Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police 1 of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propa- ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the”
“discussed. The hard intelligence gathered so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required. The establishment of SA-2s and, other advanced defensive systems had- bee”
“SECRET CONTENTS INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP Page I.Introductory Statement... 1 II.Summary of Major Findings............ : 3 III.Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962.... 7 '(A) Cuban Forces.,....,..,-,...., 7 (B) Intelligence Activities and Operations 8 IV. S”
“TOP SECRET DINAR .CHESS..RUFF IDEALIST right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning .these pictures to Washington. 7. The Checklist reported the accumulating inf”
“paper on "The Movement of Subversive s and Subv ersive Trainees" and other sources, ins tru cted th e non-isthmian posts to encourage host governments to take additional counter-subversion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local situation in the recipient country and in”
“OP SECRET 37 1 of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-2 2 photograph. He never articulated that to us in those terms. 5 •..Then.we got caught up into the eyeball to eyeball confron- 4 tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we 5 got caught up with”
“that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which crossed this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This 1s the Lizrat $ix3, I cozloss,” the U.S. Repres”
“-7- 2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda Central Intelligence Arenes Responding ta the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guansbara seized large quantities of props- ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubans flights. For example, som”
“SECRET - 22 - The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks an”
“intel ligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of US missile bases in places like Italy ”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTk 12 HOUSE WAL, 4C 43. For the better part of two years, CIA had been check ing information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the informa tion was of a kind that could be verified”
“Soviets are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba, since last fall. Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on 6 July appears on close examination by photo interpret”
“had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the construct”
“SECRET: -5- 3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas’ and Arms Department of Defense a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963. b. Continued to ma”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST J. The Soviet Offensive Deployment 36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few .steps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba. Examination of information now available makes it possible to outline with a fair degree ”
“SECRET 11 - physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet comb”
“e 33 President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photogra”
“5 TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST I. CIA Reporting during September 34. The progressive uncovering of the Soviet program in Cuba was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence, 'Pertinent samples from the Checklist are: a. "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains”
“SECRET -7- 2. Control of Novement of Cube Pronscando Central Intelligence Agency Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of props- genda brought into Brasil by passengers on the special fates flights. For example”
“mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed. CIA and military intelligence, by u”
“SECRET -5- 3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms Department of Defense a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963. b. Continued to maint”
“3-00000 ■0 MT MU MD MV Coy ES Gate Ettas dread •I 3. USSR-Cuba C0 • In the past week we inter 24 X cepted Cuban military [messages which@ show that Cuban interpreters are now / posted at several surface-to-air mis 03 sile (SAB) sites on the island. bV er 000 b. We thi”
“example the aerial bombardment of the U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba. e. GNVA 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 63 (TDCSDB 3/653,939) Files 68-6-147/4 At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of”
“. s 7 13. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Present ing the Photographic Evidence Abroad (MS-7) 14. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Second Presentation to DeGaulle (MS-8) PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY 0 A NW 50955 DocId: 32112994 Page 8”
“SECRET - 4 - 4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which lat”
“R/AAII(}: ,(t WRU ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Export o Rev. Th., material contains information effecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Dapionage Low: Title NO FOREIGN DISSEM WH PKW • 18, U.S.O. Becs. 793 and 794, the transmission or ”
“13-00000 Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries. This is the situation I fear, a”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST B. The Soviet Operation Begins 4. During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships ’carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in the period 26-29 July. Knowledge of some o”
“c 20 o gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges. Ono one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at th© first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries® which the Sovie”
“man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers. A comprehensive and c”
“SECRET -3- This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however include some information from other sources. Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contai”
“14-00000 4 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ORIG: A.C.. DELANEE′ ROUTING UNIT OCI SECRET chottp EXT i 7454 1605 DATE : as SEPTEMBER 1962 (so 3 I Mey 4 s T° ‘ MEXICO CITT 15S0P22/2 ZZz FROM: DIRECTOR ---- S46-CEN CONF: AD/CI2 DEFERRED INFO : ADDP, C/CA, >0/1, S/C 2 ROUTINE ”
“Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council - that month the Soviet Representative — to call an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by1the secret establishment in Cuba by the U”
“00 SECRET 10 - IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962 A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and E^uipAent In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clear”
“observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction.® The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions in Cuba.: He described the U.S. quarantine as a “net and extremely dang”
“SrCKET-SEPSLTiYE - 13 - v?/j ‘ The raids also had an impact cm the Cuban military and 37 security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed ou Nispecial alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive a positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently e launch”
“Cuba. These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph coverage of the island because of the fact”